The European tradition of thinking and public discussion is deeply rooted in Aristotle’s thesis on rhetoric. At the end of the day, this approach is also widely used in the way we see modern information warfare and tackling it. In 335 BC, Aristotle established that persuasion rests on a balance of three pillars:
- ethos (ἦθος) persuasion through the authority, credibility and moral character of the source of information;
- logos (λόγος) appeal to reason, logical reasoning, and evidence;
- pathos (πάθος) appeal to the emotions of the audience.
Aristotle believed that an effective orator must employ all three elements simultaneously and that true persuasion is possible only at their intersection.
For decades the western political elites invested in what is being called “independent media” in Ukraine and Russia, building the “ethos” of information sharing and spreading. The “BBC Standards” and other mechanisms were dedicated to build a trusted source that can educate the audience in respect to the facts and civilized discussion.
In 2014, media experts together with donors introduced the term “disinformation” and the phrase “countering disinformation,” which were subsequently transformed into dozens of derivative word-forms and slogans like FIMI, etc. The hypothesis underlying this activity was essentially “logos”, which assumed that human beings are primarily rational creatures: if one explains to them with sound arguments that they are being deceived, they will make the correct, rational decision. If the audience realises that their normal cognitive processes of the reality perception and decision making were attacked by malicious actors and dangerous ideas, then they refuse to continue belive in them and start to search for more explanations.
However, it turned out that the truth itself is not a value for many people — a point now openly emphasized by Peter Pomerantsev in his new book “How to win the information war”. “Logos” without “Pathos” is merely an argument without impact. “Facts matter,” but mostly for those engaged in fact-checking; the broader audience tends, for the most part, to disregard them.
Perhaps after the last decade we need to accept, at least partially, that we are not as noble beings as we like to imagine and “Pathos” still holds methodological leadership, transforming the political landscape of the European continent. “Pathos” is not mere propaganda, nor is it equivalent to “doing the same as Russia”. Pathos, in its constructive form, involves storytelling that motivates action or commitment to a position. This storytelling must stand on the conceptual foundation of Ethos and be built from the material of Logos — specific facts, not abstract ones, but facts directly meaningful for the target audiences being addressed and mobilized.
The set of approaches developed by Aristotle, as discussed above, can be seen as a foundation for what scientific literature describes as “narrative leadership” (or “narrative dominance”). Some commentators also refer to this concept as “cognitive superiority.”
However, European experts continue to stand on the position that “cognitive superiority” can be achieved by the accurate and comprehancive perception of reality. According to NATO Chief Scientist Research Report on Cognitive Warfare, cognitive superiority “involves understanding the operating environment and potential adversaries relative to the Alliance’s own capabilities, capacities, and objectives“.
NATO Chief Scientist Steen Søndergaard’s report shows that NATO’s approach remains stagnant, mirroring frameworks from the past decade of “disinformation”, “misinformation”, “malinformation”, FIMI and other cathegories. Consequently, “cognitive warfare” appear destined to mirror the limitations of traditional fact-checking or FIMI. The same moment Russian information warfare apparatus achieves its most potent effects within European jurisdictions, experts say.
In November 2017 I conceptualized “The Sixth Battlefield,” positing the human mind as a distinct theater of operations alongside land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace. It has taken NATO eight years to acknowledge this reality; however, current institutional adoption remains fundamentally inadequate.
Søndergaard outlines a scientific algorithm for “Countering Cognitive Warfare” wherein he defines the strategic objective as: “Leveraging aspects of human cognitive function to disrupt, undermine, influence, or alter human decision-making.” This definition is obsolete. It fails to account for reflexive control mechanisms or ontological influence on individual and collective value paradigms.
The Alliance interprets CogWar through a narrow, instrumental lens. The report assumes an “ideal-standard cognitive process” wherein individuals perceive objective reality without distortion presuming cognitive functions operate as intended by nature or traditional education, geared toward individual prosperity. Within this framework, an adversary is viewed merely as an external actor attempting to perturb these functions to manipulate decision-making outcomes.
This conceptualization is flawed for two primary reasons:
- The notion of a “ideal-standard perception of reality” is non-existent in contemporary postmodern society.
- NATO’s defined objectives for CogWar are indistinguishable from the standard marketing and branding campaigns of global corporations (e.g., Coca-Cola or Audi).
NATO maintains an archaic perspective on Cognitive Superiority, tethering it to the OODA Loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act). The premise that preventing external interference in one’s OODA Loop equates to superiority is dangerously naive in the context of 2026. The fundamental flaw in NATO’s CogWar doctrine is the absence of intent to achieve victory. Psychological scars from the 20th century’s world wars, coupled with traumatic self-reflection on colonial legacies and decades of perceived security, have eroded the Alliance’s will to engage in conflict. NATO prioritizes de-escalation over victory, even as it has effectively lost the cognitive war with the Russian Federation. Recent geopolitical shifts, such as actions surrounding Greenland, suggest a functional disintegration of the Alliance’s traditional cohesion.
The pioneer of cognitive psychology, Ulric Neisser, conceptualized the “perceptual cycle” as a dynamic feedback loop: humans do not merely observe the world; they possess internal schemata (cognitive frameworks) that drive them to seek specific environmental information, subsequently modifying either the environment itself or the schema.
NATO’s fundamental strategic failure lies in its stagnation at the initial stage of cognitive activity —perception and processing. By ignoring the secondary stage — intentionality and the generation of original meanings that reshape reality — the Alliance has adopted a purely reactive posture. Instead of actively constructing reality, they are playing a defensive game, thereby resigning themselves to a permanent “second-tier” status in the global cognitive confrontation. Cognition, as a functional process, is a bilateral intentionality comprising two distinct vectors:
- Analytical (Assimilative): The reflection of the external environment and its signals, utilizing cognitive modeling of current reality for decision-making (the classic OODA loop).
- Projective (Transformative): The generation of semantic vectors of intent aimed at the active transformation of the environment, aligned with internal values and the teleological goals they produce.
Perceptio et intentio — unitas cognitandi (Perception and intention — the unity of cognition).
The theory of “enactivism” posits that the mind does not simply mirror the world in a way that ensures maximum security; rather, it “enacts” or co-constitutes the world through interaction. We do not perceive the world as it is; we perceive it as a field of action for refinement in the pursuit of a desired future. NATO remains preoccupied with cognitive analysis solely to prevent external interference in its OODA loop. Paradoxically, a functional OODA loop within the cognitive and ideological spheres simply does not exist for the Alliance. There is no strategic cycle regarding Russia because NATO lacks a comprehensive, unified grand strategy toward it as a primary source of threat.
The American philosopher John Searle distinguished between two directions of fit in mental states:
- Mind-to-World: Where cognitive activity seeks to match the actual facts of the environment (descriptive thinking).
- World-to-Mind: Where the mind attempts to influence the environment so that the world aligns with one’s ideas (prescriptive thinking).
NATO declares its readiness to defend its populations and engage Russia in the cognitive domain. However, it attempts to do so while strategically incapacitated — operating, as it were, with its hands tied and its generative capacity surgically removed. The core issue is that NATO perceives the cognitive domain as a library where books must be meticulously cataloged, rather than a construction site where the architecture of a new world order must be built. They have finally recognized the risks of a distorted reality, yet they have forgotten how to envision the reality they wish to create.
The paradox here lies in the refusal to accept that we must compete for people’s minds within the cognitive domain. When methods of informational influence and the dissemination of ideas are applied to domestic politics or national elections—where the media and society encourage a ‘marketplace of ideas’—it is considered entirely normal. Candidates whose ideas are more compelling and effectively communicated are the ones who win. In these cases, a candidate or party achieves cognitive superiority by better understanding the public’s needs and offering a more attractive vision for the future.
The same moment the Western European experts and scholars deliberately avoid terms such as “dominance,” “leadership,” or “superiority” in the international politics and defense sectors as these may carry some colonial and hierarchical connotations that could undermine the principles of equality and inclusiveness central to democratic discourse. NATO Chief Scientist never mentioned any kind of leadership in the domain of ideas. Even considering that the so called “soft power” is the traditional instrument of diplomacy.
Unfortunately, no war can be won without one side achieving dominance over the other. Europe is engaged in a hybrid war with Russia — a fact many European politicians continue to avoid acknowledging. Unless Europe openly admits it is at war and accepts the inevitability of dominance, it cannot ensure its survival; to survive, Europe must fight.
The geopolitical behavior of Russia, China, and the United States leaves no room for passivity or for merely defending facts against manipulation. If Europe does not export its values of freedom, democracy, equity and peace, it is forced to import hybrid warfare, manipulations, terrorism, illegal migration and ruining of social cohesion.
We need to get back to the concept of Greater Europe that envisions Europe not just as the European Union, but as a wider civilizational and political space stretching across the entire European continent, including Ukraine and even partially including Russia, Belarus, Georgia, and some other post-Soviet states.
The collapse of the USSR was driven by Western narrative dominance, which asserted that the Western model of the future was superior to the Soviet one. If we want to prevent the collapse of the Russian Federation, we must take responsibility for driving change from within it. This is why it is logical that it should be part of Greater Europe. However, before we can speak of a common political, economic, and security space, we must first establish a shared understanding of reality — one grounded in freedom and human dignity. And this is what can be called the “narrative leadership” of Greater Europe in this geopolitical region.
The Greater Europe concept no longer faces direct opposition. NATO enlargement has effectively concluded with the accession of Sweden and Finland, adding a long border with the Russian Federation. At the same time, internal divisions are increasingly visible within NATO and Ukraine is unlikely to be part of it. Meanwhile, the Kremlin has begun sending political signals suggesting that Ukraine’s European integration is no longer categorically rejected.
The Greater Europe concept collapsed after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the full-scale invasion in 2022, further undermined by the growing popularity of ideas such as building a wall and even a moat with crocodiles along the border with Russia. However, kamikaze drones and missiles can easily fly over any wall, which is why an isolationist vision of Europe is not viable. If Europe does not expand through its values and ideas, it will wither and die. The greatest strength of the Greater Europe concept lies in Ukraine and the resilience of Kyiv, where people are fighting and dying not for land or resources, but for human dignity, freedom, democracy, and a West-oriented civilizational choice. No more powerful narrative in support of Greater Europe can be imagined than the reality we witness every day.
This is why, whether it wants it or not, Europe already holds narrative dominance — earned and sanctified by the blood of Ukrainian heroes. All that is required from European leaders is the courage to take up this flag and raise it high.
