Russian Intelligence Services Exposed Vadim Novynskyi and Their Foreign Agent Network

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Who is Vadym Novynskiy?

From March 20 to 24, shortly before the Day of the Security Service of Ukraine, Russian and Ukrainian propaganda Telegram channels were flooded with reports regarding an interview allegedly given by former Member of Parliament Vadym Novynskyi to the German outlet “COMPACT-TV.”

On Monday, March 16, 2026, Liga.net correspondent in Brussels Milana Holovan published an article regarding Vadym Novynskyi’s involvement in supporting the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) network in Belgium. This network is reportedly used to recruit Ukrainian refugees abroad. The report states that Novynskyi remains the primary donor for the expansion of ROC branches in Europe, focusing on influencing and recruiting Ukrainian refugees. He finances 90% of new parishes in Europe, which intercept Ukrainians in cities lacking temples of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine.

In September 2025, the State Bureau of Investigation of Ukraine announced that the Pechersk Court had ordered the arrest of Novynskyi in absentia. This followed charges of high treason and inciting religious enmity and hatred. He is also accused of tax evasion.

On Friday, March 20, 2026, only three days after the publication of the Liga.net investigation, Vadym Novynskyi launched a “media counterstrike” by distributing his interview across European countries and via Telegram channels in Russia and Ukraine.

Spanish-German Novynskyi

The full version of Vadym Novynskyi’s interview was published on March 20, 2026, on the Spanish-language YouTube channel “HerQles,” which will be detailed further. The following day, March 21, 2026, a YouTube Short excerpted from this interview was posted on the German YouTube channel “COMPACT-TV.”

Vadym Novynskyi himself announced the interview on his Telegram channel at noon on March 20. However, he provided a link to the Spanish-language “HerQles” while simultaneously confirming that he had granted the interview to “COMPACT-TV” journalists.

Detailed understanding of the dissemination of media messages is crucial for a complete comprehension of the special information operations conducted by Russian intelligence services. Therefore, we will thoroughly analyze who distributed this Novynskyi interview and how.

In the Russian segment, one of the first publications of a four-minute excerpt from the interview appeared on the “Donald Trump in Russian” Telegram channel at 16:08 on March 20, 2026 (video metadata indicates it was created at 13:49 or earlier). The video on the channel was not dubbed, and Novynskyi spoke in Russian. However, the video contained Spanish subtitles, and the link in the Telegram post directed users to the Twitter account of the Spanish media outlet “HerQles.” At the same time, the Telegram post stated that the interview was conducted by journalists from the German publication “Compact-TV.”

Moreover, on none of the “Compact-TV” resources has the full version of the interview been made publicly available in German as of the time of this investigation. Only a YouTube Short announcing the interview has been posted on the “Compact-TV” channel.

All channels continued to insist that the interview with Novynskyi was conducted by “Compact-TV,” yet they cited “HerQles” as the source. To clarify the timeline: on March 20, the full interview was released on the Spanish outlet “HerQles“; on the same day, Russian propaganda Telegram channels began distributing links to it, while claiming it was the work of the German “Compact-TV.”

At the very least, granting an interview to one media outlet only to have the video hosted by another is highly unusual. One possible explanation is that the German media outlet demanded a higher fee, leading Novynskyi (or his Russian partners) to opt for a cheaper placement with their Spanish-language affiliates.

Novynskyi: The Old “New Russian Sensation”

The peak of Novynskyi’s dissemination in the Russian information space occurred on Sunday, March 22, 2026. Particularly scandalous excerpts from his interview—in which he implies that Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy allegedly suffers from drug addiction and mental instability—were aired during prime time on the notorious Russian television channel NTV in the program “New Russian Sensations” and subsequently circulated across their Telegram channels.

At the same time, on Sunday, March 22, quotes from Novynskyi’s interview began circulating on websites that are highly likely to be under the control of Russian intelligence services and have been operating against Ukraine for nearly 10 years.

By March 22–23, Ukrainian Telegram channels joined the dissemination of this information, which was also noted by Member of Parliament Yaroslav Zheleznyak. A search for the keyword “Novynskyi” reveals that active content sharing was carried out by Ihor Mosiychuk, Oleksandr Dubinsky, the “Karty, dengi, ofshory” channel, and major channels with millions of subscribers such as “Ukraine Online” and “Times of Ukraine.”

According to Yaroslav Zheleznyak, the administration of these major Telegram channels involves Bohdan Tymoshchuk and Oleh Arutyunyans, who allegedly—again, according to Zheleznyak—cooperate with the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), the very agency investigating Novynskyi’s high treason case. According to various reports and sources, publishing a post on Telegram channels with millions of subscribers can cost between $1,000 and $3,000, and in cases of highly toxic information, this amount can double or triple.

Spanish Media “HerQles” and Its Political Background

Let us now examine the media platform that remains unnamed by Novynskyi himself and those disseminating his interview, despite the fact that all content (videos, tweets, and photos) is hosted exclusively on the resources of this Spanish outlet.

HerQles is a Spanish-language media project that positions itself as a “news agency” with the slogans “Es la hora de los patriotas” (“It is the time of patriots”) and “Ganar la Batalla Cultural” (“To win the cultural battle”). On its platforms, HerQles states it is the “voice of young counter-cultural people who do not recognize themselves in a degrading society, free thinkers and fighters ready to oppose ideological imposition,” acting “on behalf of the Spanish-speaking world in defense of our civilization, culture, and traditions.”

Spanish media identifies César Enrique Pintado Planell, originally from Valladolid, as the founder of HerQles. His social media activity began around 2020. In October 2023, Pintado spoke at a rally in Madrid’s Plaza de Colón, accusing the government of a “coup d’état in Catalonia” and calling for a “great patriotic wave capable of taking to the streets.” Pintado also heads the youth organization “Revuelta,” where he collaborates with Pablo González Gasca, who manages the digital direction for the far-right Spanish party Vox.

HerQles and Revuelta regularly broadcast and distribute messages from Vox and its leaders, including those with a pro-Russian slant. Sources close to Vox have characterized such organizations as “instruments that the party implements in civil society to create the appearance of support,” backed by the most radical Catalan branches. According to El Español, Revuelta’s donation accounts were processed via a Vox corporate email address used for internal administrative operations. Furthermore, César Pintado has appeared at events organized directly by Vox, including roundtables on freedom of speech alongside Vox MP Manuel Mariscal.

In October 2024, the Vox party received a €6.5 million loan from the Hungarian MBH Bank Nyrt, co-owned by Lőrinc Mészáros—a childhood friend of Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán—while the Hungarian government maintains a 30% stake in the bank. Similarly, Marine Le Pen’s “National Front” previously received substantial loans from the First Czech-Russian Bank and the Russian bank “Strategia,” which were ultimately never repaid due to bankruptcies and debt assignments. When the Hungarian loan to the Spanish party was exposed, both the Hungarian government and party representatives denied the arrangement.

In exchange for financial support, HerQles promotes Russian narratives in the Spanish-language online space. During the COVID-19 pandemic, while Russia and Kirill Dmitriev were intensively promoting the Sputnik-V vaccine, HerQles recommended that its followers obtain information through Russia Today (RT)—a Kremlin-controlled media resource banned in the EU—claiming RT was “one of the few media outlets covering the Covid vaccine issue and the Pfizer scam with appropriate depth.” Following the start of full-scale Russian aggression against Ukraine, HerQles channels associated with Revuelta advocated for ending Western weapon supplies to the Ukrainian army and characterized Zelenskyy as a “dangerous type” and a “globalist.”

A key sponsor and coordinator of resource support for ultra-conservative movements in Europe is the Russian “Orthodox oligarch” Konstantin Malofeev. He finances the Spanish-language pages of the Russian (Duginist) sites Katehon.com and Geopolitica.ru, where representatives of the Vox party are frequently published.

To facilitate agent infiltration into far-right and anti-globalist Spanish political structures, Russian intelligence services utilize Malofeev’s funding directed toward organizations led by Ignacio Arsuaga—HazteOír and CitizenGo. Arsuaga has received Russian funds, and Russians have sat on the boards of his organizations. Malofeev reportedly financed HazteOír, which was one of the organizations providing political support for Vox.

Thus, it can be stated with a high degree of probability that HerQles—the media outlet left unnamed in the posts of Novynskyi and other Russian propagandists—may be collaborating with Russian intelligence services.

“Stasi” on the Line

We shall now examine in detail the aforementioned German media outlet “Compact-TV,” which, according to Novynskyi, conducted the interview but failed to publish the full video on any of its online media platforms.

The YouTube channel of the German media organization “Compact-Magazin GmbH” (registered address: Gut Nöbeditz 1, 06667 Stößen; directed by Jürgen Elsässer) serves as a niche platform for radical viewpoints in Germany, spanning both the right and left wings. Consequently, “Compact-TV” provides media support to political movements that align with Vladimir Putin’s interests and Kremlin policy, specifically representatives of the Alternative for Germany (AfD) party and the Sahra Wagenknecht Alliance.

German state institutions, extremism researchers, and several independent media outlets have repeatedly confirmed “Compact-TV’s” affinity for pro-Kremlin narratives, conspiracy theories, and its systemic interaction with Russian information and political structures.

The founder and long-time head of “Compact,” Jürgen Elsässer, is reasonably suspected of close cooperation with Russian intelligence services. Previously a publicist for leftist movements, he transitioned into a far-right ideologue in the 2010s—following new directives from the “Center.”

Until 2024, Kai Homilius was among the organization’s co-owners. Video content is produced by affiliated entities such as Conspect Film GmbH, which maintains close ties with the AfD and pro-Russian political figures in Germany. “Compact” consistently promotes far-right, populist, conspiratorial, and antisemitic narratives, maintaining an anti-establishment stance toward the German political system. The editorial office primarily targets audiences in Eastern Germany, including “Russian-German” communities, exploiting historical grievances and specifically targeting pro-Russian voters. To this end, “Compact” actively broadcasts pro-Kremlin messages: justifying Russian aggression in Ukraine, blaming NATO for inciting conflict, denying the occupation of Crimea, and echoing the talking points of Kremlin mouthpieces such as RT and Sputnik.

Between 2014 and 2023, Jürgen Elsässer collaborated with RT Deutsch staff, publishing special editions featuring apologies for Putin and translations of Russian speakers for the local audience. Interviews with Russian officials, such as Maria Zakharova, regularly appear in “Compact Edition” and “Compact Digital” formats.

On July 16, 2024, Federal Minister of the Interior Nancy Faeser officially banned the far-right “COMPACT-Magazin GmbH” and the associated “CONSPECT FILM GmbH,” labeling them a “central mouthpiece for the right-wing extremist scene,” a “source of antisemitism and xenophobia,” and a distributor of content inciting the overthrow of Germany’s constitutional order. During searches, data, materials, and financial documents were seized. As early as 2021, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution classified “Compact” as a tangible element in the dissemination of destructive information influences within German society, emphasizing the risk of political destabilization via post-2022 pro-Russian disinformation campaigns.

In June 2025, the ban was challenged in court and lifted on the grounds that it did not fully meet procedural requirements and lacked sufficient evidence—a reflection of German institutional hesitation in cases not involving “Russian interests” like Nord Stream.

Jürgen Elsässer himself has confirmed long-standing ties with Russian state media and structures that systematically advance Kremlin narratives in Germany and Europe. He has frequently appeared as a guest on Russian state television, particularly RT Deutsch.

Under Elsässer’s leadership, “Compact” organized conferences and thematic events alongside the Institute for Democracy and Cooperation (Paris), a pro-Russian French organization funded by the Russian Federation. Elsässer received direct funding for his events from this institute, which is utilized for the soft promotion of Russian policy in Europe. Since the 2010s, Elsässer has regularly held thematic public presentations at the Russian House in Berlin. In cooperation with official representatives of the Russian embassy, he has published special editions honoring Putin.

Old FSB Dogs Can’t Be Taught New Tricks

A key aspect in the history of Elsässer’s poorly concealed cooperation with Russian intelligence services is his interview with the former associate of Ivan Bakanov, former SBU Brigadier General, and former Head of SBU Internal Security—Andriy Naumov. It was Andriy Naumov, in his capacity as Head of SBU Internal Security, who approved the appointment of Oleh Kulinich, the former Head of the SBU Main Directorate in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, who is now accused of high treason against Ukraine.

On October 21, 2025, Elsässer and his media outlet “Compact-TV” published an interview with Andriy Naumov, in which he accused Zelenskyy of political persecution and shifted the responsibility for Russian aggression onto him.

By October 26, 2025, a montage of video footage from Naumov’s interview was aired on the same Russian television channel, NTV. However, the video sequences in the interview on the “Compact” YouTube channel and on NTV did not always match. For instance, the NTV footage clearly shows that Naumov’s interlocutor is certainly not Elsässer, but rather another Russian-speaking individual.

In other words, the FSB filmed extensive material with Naumov, who provided answers on camera to an unidentified individual at several locations in Vienna (the exact recording sites are easily geolocated). They then simply provided “Compact” with specific video clips for Elsässer to record the studio segments required by his handlers. This resulted in several versions of Andriy Naumov’s interview: Naumov’s monologue in Russian, Elsässer’s program in German, and a montage on NTV featuring a dramatic female voiceover detailing various “horrors.”

Additional evidence of Andriy Naumov’s potential presence in Vienna comes from numerous interviews given by Serhiy Vahanyan to Ukrainian politician and blogger Boryslav Bereza, in which Vahanyan detailed his meetings with fugitive Ukrainian officials in the city.

However, Naumov’s cooperation with the FSB to create video content targeting Zelenskyy was not initially clear-cut. When his interview was released in November 2025, one could have assumed that Naumov had simply been intimidated.

At the same time, even a third-year cadet at the National Academy of the Security Service of Ukraine, just beginning to study specialized counterintelligence disciplines, knows one simple fact: repetition is the most significant giveaway of intelligence agency involvement.

In the cases of Andriy Naumov and Vadym Novynskyi—both suspected of collaborating with enemy intelligence—the agencies did more than just repeat themselves. Both cases were executed using the exact same blueprint, suggesting that Russian intelligence officers have become lazy or have lost their sense of caution in European countries.

Andriy Naumov was filmed in Vienna, even though “Compact-TV” is a German media outlet. The content was then handed over to NTV media personnel for editing and compilation. After the information was broadcast via NTV, links to the content were injected into the Ukrainian media space through local agents and paid “jeans” (clandestine PR) in Ukrainian media and blogs.

Vadym Novynskyi’s interview was produced and distributed in an absolutely identical manner at every stage: filming with a Russian interviewer, editing, broadcasting the montage on NTV, and injection into the Ukrainian media space. However, during this process—for reasons unknown to me—Russian intelligence services also exposed their contacts within the Spanish far-right community.

Where Vadym Novynskyi Was Filmed

While the hypothesis regarding Andriy Naumov’s presence in Vienna has been discussed for some time, the whereabouts of Novynskyi, who is suspected of high treason, remain non-public. Based on an analysis of the materials from both interviews, it can be assumed that the filming crews traveled to their subjects in both instances. In Naumov’s case, this was Vienna. But what about Novynskyi?

The interview with Vadym Novynskyi begins with an outdoor shot. The street shown in the video is located in the city of Opatija, Croatia. The camera is positioned near the entrance to the “Hotel Bellevue,” located at Ul. Maršala Tita 154.

The interview itself opens with Vadym Novynskyi addressing Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy (notably, the previous interview with Andriy Naumov begins in an almost identical manner, indicating a complete lack of creativity on the part of the FSB). In the video, Novynskyi is standing on a hotel terrace featuring red marble floor patterns and gray sofas.

In the photographs from this hotel, it is possible to identify with centimeter precision the exact spot where Vadym Novynskyi is standing and smiling.

The red marble floor inlays are highly distinctive and easily recognizable.

It should be noted that Vadym Novynskyi previously had business interests in the Croatian steel industry. As early as December 2006, structures controlled by Novynskyi’s Smart-Holding Group won a tender for the privatization of the Zeljezara Split steel mill, located in the nearby city of Split, Croatia. The investment was short-lived, as the group exited the enterprise within a few months, reportedly due to an inability to fulfill specific investment obligations.

In January 2017, Vadym Novynskyi visited Croatia, where he met with Prime Minister Andrej Plenković. While the primary stated goal of the meeting was cooperation in shipbuilding, discussions centered on the settlement of the conflict in Donbas and political issues.

Thus, it is not known for certain whether Novynskyi resides at the hotel where the filming took place. It is possible that the recording was conducted in various locations and that Novynskyi’s address on the hotel terrace was filmed separately from the main interview. However, it would be entirely appropriate to approach Croatian law enforcement authorities regarding the newly discovered materials—graciously provided by Novynskyi himself in his interview—to inquire about both his whereabouts and potential assets or real estate within Croatia.

Conclusions

We have long known that Russian intelligence operatives often lack strategic flexibility. In principle, this is what allows us to survive under the enemy’s pressure. However, making such blatant errors so clumsily is a relatively new development.

First, the question of which specific Russian intelligence agency we are dealing with remains open. I am inclined to independently verify the State Bureau of Investigation (SBI) data regarding Kulinich and Sivkovych—who had direct contact with Bakanov and Naumov—working for the FSB’s 5th Service, as claimed by the Ukrainian SBI. Therefore, identifying whose agent apparatus we have managed to expose through this publication (SVR, GRU, or FSB) is a question we will leave unanswered for now. It is possible that citing two media outlets simultaneously (German and Spanish) in all posts was done so that both involved intelligence services could receive their “medals.”

Second, the repetitive nature of the scenarios in the interviews with Andriy Naumov and Vadym Novynskyi provides grounds for the hypothesis that both influence operations were conducted by the same individuals. Those who worked with Naumov likely worked with Novynskyi as well.

Third, Konstantin Malofeev’s involvement in financing far-right conservative structures in Spain—which have direct contact with the media outlets distributing Novynskyi’s video—may indicate a link between Malofeev’s funds and Novynskyi’s activities. This is particularly relevant in the context of the financing of British lawyer and lobbyist Robert Amsterdam.

Fourth, the public interview may be connected to the report by the Liga.net journalist, who might have been “spotted” during her investigation in Belgium. This is not her fault. More likely, one of the sources she spoke with was within Novynskyi’s orbit, allowing for the rapid preparation of counter-material in hopes of framing the situation as political persecution. Thus, it is possible that Novynskyi himself initiated and commissioned the interview, and was simply “milked for money” as usual.

Fifth, the religious front for control over the Ukrainian church remains one of the most tense areas. The work of Ukrainian intelligence services in this segment deserves recognition. However, it is still insufficient for victory on this battlefield. It must be understood that more is at stake than just the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) and influence over parishes in Ukraine. In his interview, Novynskyi makes it clear that he considers Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew a personal enemy and sees himself as Kirill Gundyayev’s soldier in the struggle for control over the Phanar.

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